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The problem of religious pluralism in Dagestan, particularly as it relates to the 
appearance of what has been termed "Wahhabism," had a direct bearing on the armed 
confrontations of August 1999 which sparked the current war in Chechnya. Last August, 
"Wahhabis" and other radical Islamic groups staged an incursion from Chechnya into 
border regions of Dagestan, with the intention of inspiring an Islamic revolution. After 
those efforts were suppressed, the Russian forces crossed the border into Chechnya in 
the first days of October 1999, starting the second Russian-Chechen war. A close 
analysis of the August events can shed light on the origins of the present war and on the 
complex situation in Dagestan.
The 1990s brought with them a genuine religious renaissance in the Republic of 
Dagestan (RD), mostly among Muslims. Today in RD there are 1,700 Muslims 
congregations (which constitute more than one-half of Muslim congregations in all of 
Russia).(2)
Most local Muslims are Sunni with a traditional inclination to Sufi Islam. There are three 
Sufi brotherhoods in Dagestan: Naqshbandia, Qadiria and Shadhilia. During the Soviet 
time, Sufi brotherhoods were forbidden. Now the brotherhoods have reemerged and 
with them there is a proliferation of sheikhs (elders). The most influential sheikh of 
Dagestan is Said-efendi of Chirkey, an ethnic Avar, the largest ethnic group in 
Dagestan.(3) His disciples, mostly Avars, control the Spiritual Board of Muslims in 
Dagestan (SBMD) and wield significant political authority. Some Sufi sheikhs have close 
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connections with other Dagestani ethnic groups: Muhammad Mukhtar is a Kumyk, 
Serajuddin is a Tabaseran, Tajuddin is an Andi (from the village Ashali).
At the beginning of the 1990s, attempts were made to create Muslim boards for each of 
the separate ethnic communities in Dagestan. Kumyks, Dargins and Laks took steps to 
form their own administrations. The process came to a halt in February 1994, when the 
Dagestan Supreme Soviet ruled that there should be only one Islamic administration for 
the republic, as in the Soviet era. Since then, the SBMD has controlled (or tried to 
control) all the activity of registered mosques, both the majority Sunni and the minority 
Shi'ite. The SBMD acts to a certain extent as a Dagestani state church, similar to the 
Russian Orthodox Church's Moscow Patriarchate. Just as the patriarchate lobbied hard 
for the new federal law on religion, finally signed by President Yel'tsin in September 
1997, so the board has been lobbying the Dagestan People's Assembly for a similar law 
to strengthen its already quasi-governmental status. 
Traditional Sufi Islam is first of all spiritually directed and interprets "jihad" as the 
personal self-improvement of a believer. Radical Muslims, or the supporters of "pure 
Islam," appeared in Dagestan at the end of the 1980s. By the second half of the 1990s, 
this movement had adopted a more formal structure and today it is called the "Muslim 
Jama'at" (Muslim community). The spiritual leader and main representative of the 
radical Muslims (the so-called "Wahhabis") is Bagauddin Magomedov. He told me, "We 
do not want to seize power, we want all power to be in the hands of Allah. For us, 
geographic and state borders have no significance, we work and act in those places 
where it is possible for us to do so. Dagestan today is being governed from Moscow; we 
do not have an Islamic society like that which exists in Chechnya."
It is true that Chechnya, although never formally recognized, has become the first 
"Islamic state" to be declared on the territory of the former USSR. However, the 
supporters of the "Muslim Jama'at" model themselves more on the Taliban state of 
Afghanistan and the Sudan.
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Bagauddin, an ethnic Khvarshin who was proclaimed as "Amir of Muslim Jama'at," told 
me in July 1997 that the post-communist government of Dagestan was "in a state of 
shirk (paganism). We would approve a total ban on the sale of alcohol, but for us our 
iman (faith) and tawhid (monotheism) are much more important. We would employ the 
services of the muhtasibin (moral police) in an Islamic state. For us the use of tobacco 
and drugs is considered to be haram (forbidden)."
Starting in 1993, Bagauddin and his closest associates, who were based in the town of 
Kyzilyurt near Makhachkala, were subjected to systematic discrimination and repression 
by the government and by representatives of the traditional Sufi Islam. In the fall of 
1997, Bagauddin and his closest associates retreated to Chechnya, calling this voyage 
a "hijra" in an allusion to the Prophet Mohammed's journey from Mecca to Medina in the 
year 622. The growing alienation of the "Wahhabi" movement from the rest of Dagestani 
society contributed to the radicalization of the movement.
To a large extent the beliefs of the Jama'at movement were put into practice in 
1997-1999 in the villages of Karamakhi and Chabanmakhi, located in the Buinansk 
region in the central part of Dagestan. The majority of the villages' inhabitants accepted 
the ideology of this radical movement, and the local Muslim community (which had its 
mosque in the village of Karamakhi) became a tiny "Wahhabi" republic the advance 
guard of radical Islam in Dagestan. Young people in search of "pure Islam" flocked to 
these villages from all over Dagestan and other republics of the Northern Caucasus.
While the villagers respected Bagauddin as their moral and ideological authority, they 
looked to Habib Abd al-Rahman Ibn al-Khattab as their military authority. Khattab, a 
Jordanian by birth, even lived in Karamakhi before the war in Chechnya broke out in 
December 1994. His closest ally, who led the defense of Karamakhi and Chabanmakhi, 
is Jarulla Rajbaddinov.
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In July and August 1999, a researcher from Moscow's Institute of Oriental Studies spent 
several weeks visiting this community. The researcher, who has asked to remain 
anonymous, agreed to share his impressions here. 
[Narrative start]
"Along the narrow stony road leading to the village of Karamakhi, signs warned me that 
I was in independent Islamic territory where no law other than Sharia law was observed. 
At the entrance to the village itself there was a roadblock, where I was stopped by 
several persons dressed in what appeared to be Russian army camouflage uniforms. It 
was almost impossible to make out their faces beneath their thick beards and caps 
pulled down low over their foreheads. Beyond the concrete blocks there was a high-
calibre machine gun and somewhere nearby a radio transmitter was giving out 
information. I was asked a number of questions, mainly about my reasons for coming to 
the village, where I was from, and whether anyone in Karamakhi itself was expecting 
me. I was told apologetically that every new arrival was carefully screened, and that 
"Some people arrive, spend two or three days with us and then all kinds of rubbish is 
shown on television." "But if you have come to study Islam it means that Allah has led 
you here and we cannot stand in the way of His wishes," someone added.
However, my hosts warned me that I would be closely watched for some time, since no 
one apart from Allah had the power to know what my motives were. They showed me 
the way to the headquarters of Karamakhi, where there were some young people sitting 
around, who once again started to question me. This questioning lasted from midday 
until evening, apart from breaks for prayer. The questions remained the same, only the 
people asking them changed. 
The following day I met Jarulla (the informal leader of the community) and his assistant 
Batyr. They told me that one of the "brothers" had just had a son and they invited me to 
come with them and congratulate the new father. They took me by jeep to a settlement 
up in the hills, where about 15 persons in camouflage were enthusiastically preparing 
shashlyk. 
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Gradually more and more "brothers" arrived; after about half an hour there were over a 
hundred. Following the formal celebration the "brothers" had a shooting contest. They 
placed thin wooden batons at a distance of around 100 meters and used them for target 
practice. All kinds of weapons came out, including automatic pistols, rifles, sniper guns, 
machine guns (they also had grenade discharger cups but did not use these). Jarulla 
favored a sawed-off shotgun and seemed to be able to hit the target without even 
aiming. It should be noted that at these "competitions" there was no excessive 
excitement or rivalry. The "brothers" were simply testing how accurately they could 
shoot, how prepared each of them was for a war with the infidels. Afterward they played 
football. 
Towards evening we returned to the settlement, where a local commander, "Amir" 
Shamil, took me to his base, a large house defended by three camouflaged machine 
gunners. Shamil lined up the 25 members of the "jama'at." He announced that another 
"brother" had come to join them. They were young persons ranging in age from 18 to 
30, who had begun to follow Allah. They quickly wrote down the main prayers for me 
(Arabic words written in Russian script) and warned me that, if I had not learned them 
by the following day, I could expect to get 10 lashes.
This "brotherhood" was made up of various persons: drifters, the unemployed, 
criminals, those avoiding military service and also those who had been brought by force 
to the "jama'at" by their friends in order to free them from alcohol or drug dependency. 
These people are afraid to return to their old haunts, back to "Jahilia" (ignorance). The 
drug rehabilitation program there was very simple: At the first sign of weakness, one 
would be beaten.
Members of the "jama'at" came from various ethnic groups such as Laks, Kumyks and 
Avars; almost half were Lezgins. Eventually I was accepted into the "Taliban" training 
program, which had two phases. The first was an ideological training course, involving 
study of the foundations of the faith; the underlying principle was that anyone who 
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carried arms must do so in the name of Allah. The second stage was military training. 
Any activity must begin with the word "bismillah" (In the name of Allah).
Our daily routine was as follows: We would get up at about half past two in the morning, 
perform our ablutions and at around three say the early morning prayer. Afterwards we 
would study the Koran and learn surats by heart. At six we would begin our physical 
exercises a cross-country run of about six kilometers. On one of these runs three 
brothers fell behind and the amir rebuked them with the words, "If you are so slow here, 
how will you be able to take Moscow?" At eight we all had breakfast. There was a 
generous supply of food; according to the amir, bread alone cost 100 rubles a day. Each 
day a so-called "khidma," a team to cook and serve the meals, was appointed. 
Unfortunately, few of the "brothers" were good cooks. 
After breakfast we had about half an hour to wash and to shave. Then we studied until 
the midday prayer. Afterwards we had lunch, rested for two to three hours and said the 
early evening prayer. Then we had more lessons in which alims (scholars) who had 
studied in Egypt, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Syria taught us about monotheism, giving 
detailed explanations of "ihsan" (excellence of behavior borne out of a strong love for 
God), "ibadat" (worship, obedience and service to God), and the daily prayer rituals. We 
also studied the "hadiths," which the storyteller had to know by heart. Often, especially 
on Fridays, we were shown documentary films about various zones of conflict between 
Muslims and "unbelievers." Apart from this there was a whole body of Islamic literature 
in the Russian language available for us to study independently. This included works by 
authors such as S. Qutb, M. Tagaev, Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, Abu Ala Maududi 
and Hassan al-Banna (the Egyptian founder of the Muslim Brotherhood). Before reading 
these works we were advised to concentrate on strengthening our own "iman" (faith). 
There was little time between the sunset and late evening prayers. 
At the end of the three-week course we had examinations. Each "brother" had to learn 
15 surats by heart and answer questions. Anyone who failed had to repeat the whole 
course. Those who passed could progress to the second phase, military training. This 
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involved the study of hand-to-hand combat, the use of a various firearms including 
antiaircraft guns, and mountain-combat tactics.
Nearly all the houses in Karamakhi and Chabanmakhi had radio receivers. I was able to 
watch videotaped footage of (former Interior Minister) Sergei Stepashin's August 1998 
meeting with the villagers on local television. It should be said that as far as the villagers 
were concerned this was an explicit confirmation of their independence. Stepashin 
certainly appeared to be acknowledging this. When the Russian interior minister and his 
escort prepared to leave they were accompanied by cries of "Allahu Akbar" (God is 
great). The "Wahhabis" were openly proclaiming that they would accept only the Koran 
and the Sunna, not the Russian Constitution, as the basis for law. "[narrative ends]
At the beginning of August 1999 radical Muslims declared a jihad (holy war) for the 
liberation of Dagestan from the hands of non-believers.(4) The Chechen troop 
commander Shamil Basaev, amir of the North Caucasus liberation army, and the 
legendary commander Khattab are the military leaders of the jihad. Shamil Basaev 
distinguished himself by leading a raid on Budennovsk in 1995, following which the 
Russian leadership was forced to begin negotiations with the Chechens. In Chechnya, 
Shamil Basaev became a national hero, but in Dagestan he was not accepted as the 
leader of the jihad because leaders of holy wars, the imams, traditionally belonged to 
the Avar ethnic group. 
Khattab is more popular with the Dagestani radical Muslims. He was born in 1963 into a 
well-known Cherkess family in Jordan. According to inhabitants of the village of 
Karamakhi, when he was only 15 years old he went to Afghanistan where he gained his 
first experience of military conflict. Then he graduated from military academy in Amman 
and served for several years in the "Cherkess guard" of King Hussein.(5) In his early 
30s, Khattab moved to the Dagestan village of Karamakhi, where he married a local girl. 
According to local inhabitants, Khattab took part in the war in Bosnia, where he led a 
military training camp for local Muslims and presented a real threat to the Bosnian 
Serbs. From early 1995, Khattab was in Chechnya where he gradually became one of 
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the most influential military commanders. In spring 1996 his fighters mounted an 
ambush on the village of Iaryshmardy and destroyed a large Russian military convoy, 
killing more than 70 persons.(6)
After the end of the Chechen war in August 1996, Khattab set up a number of military 
training camps in Chechnya for the radical Muslims of the Northern Caucasus. Until the 
start of the present war, the main center for the training of warriors was situated on the 
outskirts of Serzhen-Yurt, not far from Grozny. It seems that the radical Muslims of 
Chechnya and Dagestan receive significant financial support from radical Muslim 
circles. There is evidence that they receive help from such organizations as the "World 
Jihad Front" and the Fund of the Muslim Brotherhood Party.(7)
Botlikh
By the beginning of August 1999, cross-border incidents between Dagestan and 
Chechnya were happening on an almost daily basis. Finally Basaev and Khattab chose 
the Botlikh rayon for the main thrust of their assault. They managed to attract supporters 
for the jihad from the Avar villages of Ansalta, Shodroda, Rakhata and Tando. In some 
of these villages, notably in Ansalta, there were significant groups of radical Muslim 
youths. The Islamic Republic of Dagestan was proclaimed after the rebel forces had 
seized the aforementioned villages in the Botlikh rayon. Basaev and Khattab's forces 
aimed to take Botlikh and continue along the main river, Andiiskoie Koisu, in order to 
take the village of Tlokh, which would open up the way to central Dagestan. 
Although it is estimated that only around six to seven percent of the Dagestan 
population sympathize with these radical ideas, Khattab and Basaev probably counted 
on the support of a significant proportion of the local population, thinking that they would 
be seen as liberators. However, this did not happen. Quite the reverse: Local militias 
were immediately established in the neighboring villages which had not been seized by 
the rebels. 
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In Botlikh rayon the ethnic Andi(8) closed four mountain passes, the most important of 
which are Harami and Riqwani. The Andi people have for many years quarreled with 
Chechens about alpine pastures. A decision to resist the Islamists was made by the 
Andi jama'at societies of four villages: Andi, Gagatl', Riqwani and Ashali. (Andi people 
are strong adherents of Sufi Islam and detest "Wahhabism.")(9)
The lack of popular support for the "liberators" stemmed in part from the fact that 
traditional folk Islam, which is adhered to by the vast majority of Dagestan's Muslim 
believers, coexists poorly with radical fundamentalist Islam. In those villages where 
there are supporters of both trends, separate communities have formed, each with its 
own mosque. Moreover, the majority of the population of Dagestan is extremely hostile 
and suspicious of anything connected with so-called "Wahhabism." Here the word 
"Wahhabi" has derogatory and negative connotations. As a result of the events in 
Botlikh when the insurgents were defeated, an unexpected alliance was formed 
between the Dagestanis and the federals. Women in Botlikh treated Russian soldiers as 
if they were their own sons. Nothing of this nature ever happened in Chechnya. 
Karamakhi-Chabanmakhi 
The euphoria following the defeat of the radical Muslim forces in Botlikh rayon had 
scarcely evaporated when on the night of 28-29 August punitive measures were taken 
against the inhabitants of four villages: Karamakhi, Chabanmakhi, Kadar and Durangi, 
which a year and a half ago had declared themselves to be a special Muslim area 
governed by Sharia law. The villages were totally controlled by radical Muslims, the 
majority of whom are Dargins. The decision to mount this operation was passed on 25 
August, the day Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin arrived in Dagestan. However, 
the decision was not made by him alone, but in conjunction with the chairman of the 
State Council of Dagestan, Magomedali Magomedov. These punitive measures violated 
the agreement reached in August 1998 between Stepashin and the inhabitants of the 
"Wahhabi" villages. Stepashin was warmly welcomed in the villages Karamakhi-
Chabanmakhi, and even presented with a burka. Stepashin and the Wahhabis reached 
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a verbal agreement by which they would be allowed to live according to Sharia law but 
would refrain from proselytizing their views outside their community. The Botlikh events 
gave the federal side an opportunity to violate this agreement and dispose of the 
villages.
The local leader of these four villages and the director of their defenses was Khattab's 
closest comrade, Jarulla Rajbaddinov. The villages were extremely well-armed and their 
defenses were strong. They even had antiaircraft guns. The villages were in the 
foothills, near a dense forest, where the rebels could easily retreat should they be 
forced to wage a partisan war. However, after two weeks of armed struggle, the Russian 
military forces crushed the resistance in these villages, leaving few persons alive or 
buildings in place.
Many Dagestanis with whom I held discussions as to why this punitive action had been 
undertaken said that it would have been wiser to try and seek a compromise with the 
village inhabitants and persuade them to disarm voluntarily. There is every reason to 
think it would have been possible to reach an agreement, as Stepashin had a year 
earlier, particularly since the events in Botlikh demonstrated that radical Muslims could 
not count on general support from the society and that the confrontation could lead to 
disaster. Instead of a negotiated solution, the punitive operation against the inhabitants 
of these villages has encouraged a new wave of activity from Basaev and Khattab, 
whose forces entered Novolaksky rayon on 5 September 1999. 
Novolaksky rayon
This time Basaev's and Khattab's units were comprised mostly of Chechens, and they 
rode to within five kilometers of Khasavyurt. Had they reached Khasavyurt the situation 
could have become very serious because there they would have been able to count on 
the assistance of local Chechens (Akkin Chechens)(10) who constitute more than one-
third of the city's population. If they had taken the city, the fate of the jihad would have 
unfolded in a completely different way: Khasavyurt opens up the road to Makhachkala, 
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where defenses were already being readied on the city's outskirts. Instead, by the 
middle of September the Chechen units sustained heavy casualties and had to 
withdraw into Chechnya. 
This attempt to start a jihad in Dagestan was perceived by most of the population as 
aggression organized by Chechnya's extremist circles. For this reason the local militias 
helped the federal forces against the "mujahadin." In general, the idea of jihad (or 
"gazawat" as it was called in the North Caucasus) is hardly alien to the Dagestani 
consciousness. It is particularly viable among the Avars, Dargins, Laks and Akkin 
Chechens. The gazawat was always led by an imamat whose authority extended to 
many nationalities. The last five imams, the most famous of which was Imam Shamil, 
were Avars. 
For the Avars it is inconceivable that the next imam could be a Chechen. But to some 
degree, as "amir," Basaev had pretensions to the role of imam. For most Dagestanis, 
Basaev's image robs the idea of the jihad of any allure. Chechnya, the only Islamic state 
in the post-Soviet space, did not behave according even to a loose interpretation of 
Muslim canons, which prohibit attack on fellow Muslims. Perhaps it is the negative 
example of the Chechen state of 1997-1999 that cured Dagestanis of any illusion about 
having their own "Islamic state." Certainly the armed conflicts of August-September 
1999 persuaded all the Dagestanis, regardless of nationality, that they had something to 
defend. The war against Basaev and Khattab united members of different nationalities 
and became an important factor in the formation of a Dagestani identity.
The incursion of radical Muslims from Chechnya into Dagestan and President Aslan 
Maskhadov's refusal to dissociate himself fully from Basaev by firing him from among 
the Chechen commanders and bringing him to trial(11) opened the way to the second 
Chechen war. In Dagestan itself this war is a difficult period for all Muslims (not only 
"Wahhabis") who do not agree with the policy of total control realized by the Spiritual 
Board of Muslims in Dagestan and its protector, Sheikh Said-efendi of Chirkey. Today 
security agents seize any young man suspected of being "Wahhabi." Now is a very 
11
difficult time even for other sheikhs who are not connected with Said-efendi; many fear 
that persecution is quite probable. I could mention my good friend, the sheikh of the 
Naqshbandia brotherhood, Abdulwahid from Habshchi, who told me last summer that he 
was really oppressed by murids (disciples) of Said-efendi and was afraid to live in 
Makhachkala. It seems that the authorities in Makhachkala have interpreted the lack of 
popular support for the Wahhabis and a willingness to side with the government against 
the Chechens as license to suppress further all competing strands of Islamic faith. This 
can only lead to further alienation and intolerance between the official Spiritual Board of 
Muslims in Dagestan and various representatives of the whole spectrum of belief.
Notes:
1. This paper is based on my field research and includes a narrative from a colleague 
who wishes to remain anonymous. I would like to thank the fellows of Keston Institute, 
Ms. Geraldine Fagan and Ms. Tatiana Titova, for helping me to prepare the original 
English version of this paper.
2. These data were given to me by the Committee for Religious Affairs of the Republic 
of Dagestan in June 1999.
3. According to the 1989 census, the population of Dagestan was 27.5% Avar, 15.5% 
Dargin, 12.9% Kumyk, 12.4% Lezgin, 9.2% Russian, 5.1% Lak, 4.3% Tabaseran, 4.2% 
Azeri, 3.2% Chechen, etc.
4. M. Roshchin, N. Yefremova, "Features of Jihad in Dagestan," NG-Religii, No. 16 (23 
August 2000).
5. V. Paukov, E. Lefko, "Voinny Allaha Choose the Caucasus," Vremya MN, September 
1999; cited in the weekly Mir za nedelu (Moscow) No. 1, 28 August - 9 September 1999. 
According to other sources, Khattab is a citizen of Saudi Arabia. Some who have met 
him say he is fairly well educated, for instance he uses computer analysis to plan his 
operations.
6. According to an Institute of Orientalism (RAN) Ph.D. candidate who met with 
Khattab's supporters.
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7. According to Mogomed-Rasul Mugumaev, mufti of the Confederacy of People of the 
Caucasus.
8. The Andi people were not included in the census but are estimated to number about 
40,000. In recent years they have become more politically assertive, seeking greater 
language rights and to be added to Dagestan's titular nationalities and represented on 
its state council.
9. This information was kindly given me by Prof. Mamaikhan Aglarov who visited Andi 
villages at the time of the events in Dagestan a year ago. 
10. Akkin Chechens are one of the 14 titular nationalities of Dagestan.
11. Akhmad Kadyrov, the mufti of Chechnya and now the head of the pro-Russian 
administration of Chechnya, advocated such actions. See Mikhail Roshchin, "Who holds 
the keys to the Chechen problem?" Central Asia and the Caucasus (Sweden), No. 2 
(2000), p. 15. Maskhadov did make a statement saying that Basaev and other 
Chechens involved in the incursion were acting as private citizens, certainly not on the 
behalf of the Chechen government, but unfortunately he could not find more resolute 
condemnation of this action.
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